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substantive overtones. On the other hand, questions of political and 
civil equality are increasingly pulled into the orbit of the judiciary. 
If Verba and his colleagues err, it is in thinking that the prefer-
ence given to political rights over those conventionally thought of as 
purely economic reflects some sort of eternal truth. American his-
tory reveals that this primacy is rather recent and the result of so-
cial changes of types that a time-bound study of this nature is 
unlikely to detect. Moreover, within the American political system 
this shift of attitudes is of the utmost significance: so long as prop-
erty questions are seen as matters more profane than sacred, we can 
confidently expect that, for better or worse, many constitutional 
scholars will continue to favor narrow interpretations of the prop-
erty clauses of the Constitution. 
CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH. By Sanford Levinson. 1 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1988. Pp. xii, 243. 
$19.95. 
Herbert Hovenkampz 
This well written, intelligent volume takes up a subject that is 
too big for its two hundred forty-three pages, but takes it up well 
nonetheless. Professor Sanford Levinson seeks to discover the reli-
gious content of the Constitution. Not the religion clauses of the 
first amendment, but the civil religion of the Constitution as a 
whole. In what ways is belief in the Constitution like religious be-
lief? Specifically, in what ways are the various doctrines of consti-
tutional interpretation like the doctrines of religious, or scriptural, 
interpretation? How is the constitutional oath like the pledge of 
service that the religious believer might offer to his religious organi-
zation or his god? When does dissent or unlawful behavior amount 
to an admission that one is not "committed" to the Constitution, or 
to American constitutional government? Does the law school 
teacher of the Constitution have true academic freedom, liberally 
defined? Or do we have some overriding obligation of basic fidelity 
to the constitutional enterprise? These are big questions, and Pro-
fessor Levinson provides some perspectives, though not an answer, 
for each of them. 
Levinson notes that, ever since the Constitution was written, 
its supporters have used religious language and imagery to defend it 
I. Charles Tilford McCormick Professor of Law, University of Texas. 
2. Professor of Law. University of Iowa. 
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or describe it. After two centuries of great American successes, it's 
not surprising that we speak of the "Miracle at Philadelphia." But 
even at the founding, no less an Enlightenment figure than Presby-
terian Benjamin Rush concluded that "in its form and adoption, it is 
as much the work of a Divine Providence as any of the miracles 
recorded in the Old and New Testament .... " 
As Levinson notes, the Sacred Text can have an invaluable uni-
fying effect on religion-giving diverse groups a common heritage 
and an appeal to a shared authority. But Levinson is more con-
cerned about an alternative, darker effect of the written Sacred 
Text: its "potential ... to serve as the source of fragmentation and 
dis integration." "Indeed," he concludes, "many classic constitu-
tional controversies have their parallels within the religious disputes 
of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries." An important purpose 
of the book is to "attack by implication any confidence that having 
'the Constitution' as a common symbol guarantees meaningful na-
tional political unity." 
Levinson finds distinctly "Protestant" and "Catholic" strains 
of constitutional interpretation, which account for most differences 
in constitutional ideology. The Protestant constitutional interpreter 
is one who, like Martin Luther or John Calvin, claims sola scriptura 
as a guide: we must rely, he says, on the text and little or nothing 
else. The Catholic constitutional interpreter, on the other hand, be-
lieves that interpretation requires an examination of text plus tradi-
tion-the tradition in this case being principally the nearly two 
centuries of constitutional decisions. 
Levinson finds another division, likewise drawn straight from 
Reformation controversy, over who has the authority to interpret. 
Catholics tended to believe that interpretation may come from the 
Church alone. Protestants were not as unanimous on the issue. 
Conservative Protestants (e.g., Lutherans, Congregationalists and 
Presbyterians) tended to believe that educated and ordained clergy 
had an authority to interpret that was not shared by the laity. Radi-
cals (e.g., Anabaptists and Quakers) tended to believe that every 
person had equal authority to interpret. Levinson characterizes this 
last belief as "Protestant." This gives him four schools of constitu-
tional interpretation: (a) "Protestant-Protestant"-the notion that 
the text of the Constitution alone determines its meaning, and that 
each person (or government official) has authority to interpret it; 
(b) "Protestant-Catholic"-the text of the Constitution alone in 
some way determines its meaning, but the Supreme Court is the 
supreme interpreter; (c) "Catholic-Protestant" -the meaning of 
the Constitution is its text plus the traditions handed down over the 
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past two centuries; but each person (or, at least, persons other than 
judges) have authority to do constitutional interpretation; and 
(d) "Catholic-Catholic"-the meaning of the Constitution is its 
text plus the traditions handed down over the past two centuries, 
and only the Supreme Court is the authoritative interpreter. 
"It is my central argument," Levinson asserts, "that a signifi-
cant number of constitutional debates can be organized under one 
or another of these four categories." For anyone familiar with the 
historical course of religion in the United States, this is a pessimistic 
picture of constitutional theory, at least if one accepts the usual as-
sumption that we ought to have a rational debate about constitu-
tional jurisprudence, with our goal being to unite behind a single 
wise or "legitimate" approach to the Constitution. In the religious 
environment of the United States, where no particular set of reli-
gious beliefs achieves state sanction at the expense of others, the 
most common effect of hermeneutic difference has been an end of 
debate. Over most of our religious history, American Protestants 
have not bothered to debate with American Catholics over the rela-
tive values of Protestant and Catholic hermeneutics. They have 
simply talked about each other, called each other heretical, and 
competed for followers. For most of our history many believed that 
our religions lacked enough common ground even to begin a 
dialogue. 
Religious unity almost never comes when one leader or group 
convinces the others through force of argument. It comes, if at all, 
only through the use of other kinds of power, whether excommuni-
cation or warfare. The one significant difference between Ameri-
cans' constitutional faith and religious faith of the ordinary variety 
is that almost absolute variation in the latter is protected by the 
Constitution itself. Discipline for heresy is entirely intra-institu-
tional, and can easily change our religious affiliations. In the matter 
of the Constitution, however, we are still an "established" church: 
some forms of heresy can still be punished. Rejecting the Constitu-
tion may not be an option unless one is willing to renounce his 
American citizenship altogether. 
Levinson recounts one now famous "excommunication" de-
bate: an article by Paul Carrington, then dean of Duke Law School, 
suggesting that certain legal "nihilists" resign from teaching in 
American law schools. Dean Carrington was referring to members 
of Critical Legal Studies, who had expressed varying degrees of con-
tempt for law as nothing but a disguise for political preferences. 
Because he was constrained by a concept of academic freedom, 
Dean Carrington could not advocate that law schools fire CLS 
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teachers for their views; rather, he suggested that these people 
should conclude that they "have an ethical duty to choose a career 
other than teaching law." 3 Carrington believed that even within a 
community as diverse as the academic legal community, there is 
such a thing as "heresy." In this case, heresy was contempt for the 
entire enterprise of defending any kind of rule of law. One can be-
lieve almost anything one chooses about the nature of God, but one 
may not be an atheist. 
Responding to Carrington, Levinson points out that there is 
plenty of room for atheists in the academic study of religion. When 
later called upon to defend his views, Carrington distinguished be-
tween general academic departments and professional schools. The 
latter have, as part of their mission, an obligation to inculcate in 
practitioners a basic acceptance of the enterprise being studied. For 
example, Carrington noted, although an atheist teacher might be 
perfectly appropriate in a university religion department, an atheist 
who teaches in a divinity school, which is dedicated to the training 
of clergy, has a "conflict of interest." His fundamental beliefs are 
inconsistent with the fundamental institutional commitment of his 
employer. If Catholic and Protestant institutions can discipline 
academics for heresy-and they do it all the time-then why can't 
the law schools? 
Professor Levinson's is an illuminating and even useful mes-
sage for one seeking to understand why so many people can claim 
reliance on the Constitution, even view it with reverence, yet differ 
so dramatically on questions of constitutional meaning. Levinson 
cites both Ronald Dworkin ("Catholic") and Ed Meese ("Protes-
tant") as venerators of the "Constitution"-a similarity that is 
rarely revealed in analyses of constitutional thought. 
Such powerful insights notwithstanding, one gets the impres-
sion that Levinson takes his religion much too seriously. While 
reading his analogies between religion and the Constitution I was 
drawn back to H. Richard Niebuhr's The Social Sources of Denomi-
nationalism, a book that, although written more than a half century 
ago, has never lost its force. Religious diversity within a single 
community, Niebuhr and others of his generation observed, may 
indeed be the product of deeply held religious faith. But that deeply 
held faith is nevertheless a mask over differences that are cultural, 
political, and economic. Political "in" groups tend to be orthodox 
and traditional in the matter of religion. Political "out" groups 
tend to be radical. Religious tolerance prevails mainly for an un-
principled reason: no single group has enough power to drive out 
3. Carrington. Of Law and The River, 34 J. LEGAL Eouc. 222 (1984). 
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the others or make them conform. The American doctrine of sepa-
ration of church and state, for example, developed during a regime 
when surprisingly few people were committed to disestablishment 
as a matter of principle. We became separationists because, 
although most of us would have preferred to see our own religious 
institutions established, we were loathe to run the risk that some 
other church would win that status. Even Catholics sought dises-
tablishment in America, where they were in a political minority. 
American Baptists, great champions of separationism at the time of 
embattled Roger Williams, have been very quick to legislate reli-
gious values (on such subjects as abortion, Sunday closing, and the 
teaching of evolution) more recently in states where they have be-
come dominant.4 The sad story is that separation of church and 
state is accepted as a matter of principle only by those such as 
Thomas Jefferson or the liberals of the Warren Court era who do 
not passionately subscribe to organized religion. 
And so it is with our constitutional faith. Popular constitu-
tional faiths should not be taken too seriously as expressions of 
principled positions. As a rule, they are verbal disguises for under-
lying cultural, political or economic predispositions. Unlike Profes-
sor Levinson, I do not take Ed Meese's "Protestant-Protestant" 
constitutional theory all that seriously. Mr. Meese does not like 
what the Supreme Court, particularly the Warren Court and the 
early Burger Court, has done with the Constitution. In order for 
his political and economic agenda to succeed he must challenge the 
Catholic-Catholic notion that the text and traditions (which include 
Miranda and Roe v. Wade and some statutory decisions such as 
Runyon v. McCrary) constitute the meaning of the Constitution, 
and that the Supreme Court is its only authoritative interpreter. 
I am confident that if Meese were somehow thrust into the po-
sition of attorney general in the Harding administration in the early 
1920s he would profess a very different faith. At that time a "Cath-
olic-Catholic" Supreme Court was in its first great period of consti-
tutional activism, when "due process" was interpreted to mean that 
states could not regulate minimum wages, the method of wage pay-
ment, or occupational licensing-decisions with little warrant in 
either the text of the constitutional amendments or the recorded 
debates. When Justice Holmes accused the Court in 1905 of read-
ing "Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics" into the fourteenth 
amendment, he was making the same charge that Meese has made 
more recently. Nevertheless, I suspect that a 1920s Ed Meese, U.S. 
Attorney General to President Harding, would sing a hymn to the 
4. See W. MCLOCGHLIS, NEW ENGLAND DISSEr-;T: 1630-1833 (2 vols. 1971). 
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unwritten Constitution and to the Supreme Court, its highest 
interpreter. 
In this respect, Meese is no worse than most Americans; he 
finds his constitutional religion in the same way that most of us do. 
He begins with a set of political or economic or social values and 
then selects a constitutional theory that best gives them effect. The 
religious language can be powerful, and we use it when it suits our 
purposes. But we really do not believe it anymore. We leave that 
for the unwashed. 
